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The logic ofpassion, even when it serves the right cause, is never irrefut-
able to someone who is not moved by passion.'
I Introduction
As the Articles that follow demonstrate, the Warren Court's legacy in
the field of civil rights and civil liberties is both tremendously important and
deeply flawed. The legacy is unquestionably important because the Warren
Court oversaw a judicial revolution that helped to speed the end of American
* Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
1. MARCEL PROUST, I LE TEMPS RETRoUvg [THE PAST RECAPTURED] 111 (Gallimard
1927) ("La logique de la passion, fOt-elle au service du meilleur droit, n'est jamais irrefutable
pour celui qui n'est pas passionnd."), translated in THE MAXIMS OF MARCELPROUST 35 (Justin
O'Brien ed. & trans., 1948); see also MARCEL PROUST, THE PAST RECAPTURED 61 (Andreas
Mayor trans., 1970) ("The logic of passion, even if it happens to be in the service of the best
possible cause, is never irrefutable for the man who is not himself passionate.").
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apartheid in the Deep South. One cannot overestimate the significance of this
legacy: Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues did more to advance the
project of equal citizenship than any court, state or federal, before or after.
As in the field of criminal procedure and with respect to the role and
function of the federal courts, the Warren Court's efforts in the area of civil
rights and civil liberties were nothing short of revolutionary.2 Whether in the
area of freedom of speech, equal protection, or substantive due process, Chief
Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues redefined - in a radical way - the
relationship of the citizen to the state.
Consider, for example, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 a case that
distinguished free speech scholar Alexander Meiklejohn characterized as "an
occasion for dancing in the streets."'t In New York Times, Justice Brennan
effectively abolished the concept of seditious libel against the state - a concept
incorporated in the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 and never formally repudi-
ated until 1964.' Essentially, the Warren Court created a right of fair - even if
factually inaccurate - comment by the citizen against the government. Argu-
ably, the intellectual framework of New York Times provided inspiration for
later cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio,6 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,' and
even Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.'
Similarly, how can one talk meaningfully about equal protection
doctrine without mentioning Brown v. Board of Education,9 Bolling v.
Sharpe,10 Baker v. Carr," and Reynolds v. Sims? 2 In the context of state
2. See Owen Fiss,A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991) (canvassing
scope of legal - and moral - wrongs that Warren Court confronted and redressed, describing
Warren Court's labors as "a program of constitutional reform almost revolutionary in its
aspiration and, now and then, in its achievements," and concluding that Warren Court "spurred
the great changes to follow, and inspired and protected those who sought to implement them").
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of
the First Amendment" 1964 S. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn).
Professor Kalven shared Meiklejohn's enthusiasm for the decision. See id. ("As always, I am
inclined to think (Meiklejohn] is right.").
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,273-77 (1964) (discussing history of Alien
and Sedition Act of 1798 and concluding that "[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in
this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history").
6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
8. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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action, the most aggressive tests find their genesis in Warren Court opinions,
particularly in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority13 and Reitman v.
Mulkey. 4 Finally, the resurrection of meaningful substantive due process
review was the handiwork of the Warren Court. Without Griswold v. Connect-
icut,'5 it is less certain that we would have Roe v. Wade. 6 The Supreme
Court's return to substantive review of state and federal legislation for consis-
tency with unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights runs back to Griswold (as
does the rehabilitation of Lochner" era cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska"5 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters9).
.A Brief Review of the Warren Court's Approach to Enforcing
Constitutional Rights: The Unfortunate Disjunction ofMeans and Ends
The most notable characteristic of the Warren Court in the field of
enforcing constitutional rights was its creativity in reaching results favorable
to those asserting rights against the government and the consistency with which
it exhibited this creativity. Most of the time, I find myself very sympathetic to
the outcomes in the Warren Court's major civil rights and civil liberties deci-
sions.' However, that said, I harbor some serious reservations about the long-
term effects of the methodology often employed by the Warren Court in
reaching these desirable results.2' A careful scholar of the Constitution and
constitutional jurisprudence should have serious misgivings about the Warren
Court's willingness to accept and embrace its role as a political institution by
reaching results that created new law without much of an effort to ground the
result in the text or history of the Constitution or to relate the result back to
prior judicial precedents.22 More often than not, if the end was sufficiently
13. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. Cf. Laura Kalman, Comment, The Wonder of the Warren Court, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
780, 781 (1995) ("Pick up any Harvard Law Review Foreword from the Warren Court's glory
days, and you will find famous law professors applauding the results the Warren Court reached
while worrying about its activism.").
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), presents a paradigmatic example.
Reread Justice William 0. Douglas's opinion and ask yourself whether penumbras of judicial
reasoning emanate from it.
22. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 747, 761 (1992) ("The Warren Court Justices saw their service on the Supreme Court
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important, the means used to get there did not terribly concern the Warren
Court. Arguably, this ends-justify-the-means approach overshadowed - and
ultimately betrayed - the Warren Court's institutional obligations to act as a
legal and judicial institution.23
Yet, serious methodological misgivings notwithstanding, one should
neither overlook nor underestimate the Warren Court's unwavering commit-
ment to transforming merely theoretical (and largely empty) constitutional
promises into meaningful (and judicially enforceable) rights. The outcomes
in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education24 and Gideon v. Wainwright 25
were far from preordained. A Court composed of members with less vision,
less compassion, or less courage easily could have decided these cases quite
differently. Moreover, Chief Justice Warren's personal stewardship of the
project of expanding the scope and meaning of civil rights and liberties was
simply remarkable. Earl Warren was indeed the "Super Chief."1
26
Nevertheless, one cannot look back without experiencing a certain
sense of disappointment at the means sometimes used to accomplish laudable
ends. Chief Justice Warren and his Court often placed results above process -
a decision that might have seemed necessary (if not prudent) at the time, but
in the hindsight of history, a decision that has proven quite detrimental to the
long-term impact of the Warren Court's precedents. It would be something of
an understatement to suggest that scholars have not particularly celebrated the
Warren Court for its judicial craftsmanship.27
When reading some of the Warren Court opinions, one wonders
precisely why a particular result flows, inexorably, from the Constitution.
as just another job on the national political scene.").
23. See id. at 759 ("To conservatives, the Warren Court converted constitutional law into
ordinary politics.").
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-8, 18-23 (1996) (arguing that Warren Court's
school desegregation decisions were less counter-majoritarian in historical context than
commentators generally assert).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. See BERNARD9 SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARLWARREN AND is SUPREME COURT -
A JUDICIAL BIoGRAPHY 771 (1983) (describing Justice William J. Brennan's use of "Super
Chief' as nickname for Chief Justice Warren and observing that this title "was soon adopted by
those in the Court who were growing increasingly nostalgic about the Warren years").
27. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief Earl Warren and the Supreme Court,
81 MICH. L. REv. 922, 930 (1983) ("Although Warren was an important and courageous figure
and although he inspired passionate devotion among his followers.., he was a dull man and
a dull judge."); Bernard Schwartz, ChiefJustice Earl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 TULSA
L. J. 477, 479 (1997) ("Certainly, Warren was anything but a learned legal scholar."). See
generally 0. EDWARD WHrE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 4, 186-87,217-21,229-30,358-
67(1982).
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Consider Boiling v. Sharpe,25 the decision holding the operation of segregated
public schools in the District of Columbia unconstitutional on Fifth Amend-
ment due process grounds.29 Declaring it to be "unthinkable"3 that the Consti-
tution permits actions at the federal level that the Equal Protection Clause
would prohibit if undertaken by a state government, Chief Justice Warren
declared that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause "reverse incorporates"
the Equal Protection Clause against the federal government (including the
District of Columbia). It is rather doubtful that the Reconstruction-era
Congress would have considered it unthinkable that it possessed an ability to
use racial classifications, even if the states did not possess such an ability. 2
After all, Congress considered itself the principal protector of the newly
emancipated freedmen's civil and political rights. Moreover, its members
expressly reserved to themselves the power to enforce the substantive provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
From the perspective of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the federal government was the answer to the pervasive problem of racial
discrimination by the state governments, not part of the problem. Accord-
ingly, Congress might have written the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude
states from using racial classifications while reserving for itself an ability to
write laws that expressly use race as a basis for granting or withholding
28. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
29. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying Brown v. Board of
Education's interpretation of Due Process Clause to schools in District of Columbia).
30. Id. at 500 (arguing that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government").
31. Id., see also WHITE, supra note 27, at 363 (arguing that "Warren turned Boiling v.
Sharpe into an unconventional equal protection case," noting that "[t]he important thing [for
Warren] was to reach a result outlawing segregation in the District of Columbia," and suggest-
ing that, for Warren, "[h]ow that result was accomplished was much less significant").
32. See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-22 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that Congress's "legislative powers concerning matters of race were
explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment" and suggesting that purpose of Fourteenth
Amendment was to limit state control over matters of race while enlarging congressional
oversight of such matters); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73, 483-84 (1980)
(holding that Congress has broad discretion to enforce Fourteenth Amendment, including
authority to adopt race-based remedial plans, because it has been "expressly charged by the
Constitution with competence and authority to enforce the equal protection guarantees"). See
generalyJoHNHPEFRANKLIN,REcONSTRUCTIONAFFR ThECivILWAR36-39, 56-61,152-69
(2d ed. 1994) (describing creation and role of Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, commonly known as Freedmen's Bureau, and political and social conditions in states
of former Confederacy that necessitated continued congressional activity to protect civil rights
of African Americans).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.").
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government benefits. The Freedmen's Bureau, with its promise of "Forty
Acres and a Mule," represents a direct use of race to grant a benefit to one
racial group (the newly freed African Americans) and yet to deny the same
benefit to other citizens who lacked membership in the preferred racial group.
Thus, the question takes on subtleties that completely transcend the
particular problem of school desegregation. One might well believe that the
federal government should be able to establish race-based remedial programs
that the state governments could not themselves establish. That is to say, the
Equal Protection Clause might be thought to leave states without the power
to use race-based classifications and yet to allow the federal government some
latitude to do so.
Yet, the Warren Court's sloppy theory of reverse incorporation,
convenient if not persuasive, left open the door to the identical application of
the Equal Protection Clause to both the state and federal governments. With
the advent of precedents disabling states and local governments from estab-
lishing "benign" race-based classifications," the Boiling holding made it very
easy to extend this prohibition to the federal government itself. And, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,35 the Rehnquist Court made this exact
jurisprudential move."'
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that the Su-
preme Court's equal protection jurisprudence reflects principles of "skepti-
cism," "consistency," and "congruence."" By this, she meant that equal
protection demands strict scrutiny of all race-based government classifications
("skepticism"), applies to minorities and non-minorities alike ("consistency"),
and binds both the state and federal governments ("congruence"). 38 Justice
O'Connor even cited Boiling v. Sharpe in support of these propositions.39
Justice O'Connor's use of Boiling was more than fair: Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and those Associate Justices who shared his vision (like Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr.), gave insufficient attention to the full implications of
their reasoning. If the end result seemed right, the reasons offered to support
the result were a matter of some indifference."
34. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-94 (holding that strict scrutiny review applies to all
state and municipal affirmative action plans).
35. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
36. See Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (requiring courts to
analyze all racial classifications, including those imposed by federal government, with strict
scrutiny).
37. Id. at 223-24.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 215-16, 224.
40. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitu-
tional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!," 90 GEO. L.J. 2087,
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In short, the Warren Court blundered by failing to do the jurispruden-
tial heavy lifting needed to author a persuasive opinion as to why the federal
government could not operate segregated schools. Deeming such arrange-
ments "unthinkable" and moving on was, at best, an incomplete effort. By
failing to engage in nuanced legal reasoning regarding the use of racial
classifications by the federal government, the Warren Court planted the seeds
of Adarand.
If subsequent political tides had favored the Warren Court's vision,
this failure of means might not have mattered. But the electorate ultimately
rejected the Warren Court's vision and elected Presidents (like Richard
Nixon) who overtly committed themselves to repealing the Warren Court's
judicial legacy (particularly in the field of criminal procedure). Had the
Warren Court put an equal emphasis on means and ends, its legacy might have
proven more robust over time. Thus, the Warren Court's disregard of legal
process values made it much easier for subsequent Supreme Court majorities
to limit or overrule the Warren Court's precedents.
Even though the Warren Court's methodology often left much to be
desired, one should not assume that all of the Warren Court's legacy has been
swept aside or diverted to jurisprudential projects at odds with Chief Justice
Warren's vision. Modem First Amendment law finds its roots in decisions
like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,41 Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 and Engel v.
Vitale. 3 Voting rights jurisprudence relates back in a rather straight jurispru-
dential line to Baker v. Carr," Reynolds v. Sims,4" and Harper v. Virginia
2089-93, 2102-04, 2117-24 (2002) (arguing that voting patterns and reasoning offered by most
Justices in Bush v. Gore reflected strategic, and perhaps even political, considerations rather
than principled adjudication of constitutional claims and warning that such behavior undermines
public's confidence in Supreme Court's work); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 502 ("To [Warren],
the outcome of a case mattered more than the reasoning behind the decision. He took full
responsibility for the former and delegated the latter, in large part, to his law clerks."); cf.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,11-20
(1959) (arguing that Supreme Court's legitimacy rests on persuasiveness of its claim of being
engaged in project of principled adjudication based on constitutional text, history, and precedent
and positing that unprincipled decisionmaking, over time, will undermine Court's claim of
being engaged in something other than politics).
41. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (immunizing press from liability
for factual errors in reporting about public officials or public figures absent showing by plaintiff
that defendant possessed actual knowledge of falsity or published with reckless disregard of
possible falsity).
42. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting advocacy of any sort in
absence of clear and present danger of imminent lawlessness).
43. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting official religious exercises in
public schools).
44. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection principle
disallows malapportioned state legislative districts and requiring each vote to count equally so
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State Board of Elections.4 6 Equal protection principles found new relevance
beginning with Brown v. Board of Education47 and, over the course of time,
the equal protection guarantee has grown to encompass protection against
invidious discrimination based on gender,4" nationality,49 disability,"° and
apparently sexual orientation."' Perhaps most importantly, the modem doc-
trine of substantive due process, which safeguards "fundamental liberties"
from abridgment absent a compelling state interest, relates directly back to
Griswold v. Connecticut2 and Loving v. Virginia.3
Modem constitutional law, at least in the area of civil rights and civil
liberties, constitutes a running commentary on the ideas and theories of the
Warren Court. Although not all Warren Court precedents have survived the
test of time, the Warren Court fundamentally reoriented the agenda of the
federal judiciary. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a contemporary debate
about civil rights and civil liberties that does not draw upon the jurisprudential
legacy of the Warren Court.
Consider, for example, the state action doctrine. As most lawyers,
scholars, and judges know, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
only safeguard individual rights against government encroachment. 4 Purely
that one person has effectively only one vote).
45. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (explicating further one-person-one-vote
rule of equal protection set forth in Baker).
46. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that Equal
Protection Clause prohibits states from conditioning voting rights in state elections on payment
of poll tax). For a discussion of the Warren Court's work in the field of equal protection and
voting rights, see Schwartz, supra note 27, at 490-92.
47. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting "separate but equal"
doctrine and ordering racial integration of public schools).
48. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (invalidating, on equal
protection grounds, bar on admission of women to state military college because state failed to
proffer "exceedingly persuasive justification" in defense of gender-biased policy).
49. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (rejecting, on equal protection grounds,
state statute that prohibited aliens from admission to practice law).
50. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985) (invalidating,
on equal protection grounds, adverse zoning decision that barred operation of home for retarded
adults).
51. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (invalidating, on equal protection
grounds, Colorado constitutional amendment that restricted ability of local and state government
to enact laws prohibiting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation).
52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating, on substantive due
process grounds, Connecticut law that prohibited distribution or use of contraceptives).
53. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia anti-miscegenation
law on both equal protection and substantive due process grounds).
54. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (observing that Bill of Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment "erected no shield against merely private conduct, however discrimina-
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private conduct need not comply with constitutional requirements. Absent a
civil rights statute extending constitutional protections to persons suffering
harms from nonstate actors," a private entity may lawfully engage in behavior
in which the government itself may not. Thus, prior to the enactment of major
new civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the presence or absence of state action
typically prefigured whether a defendant had an obligation to refrain from
racial discrimination. 6
Because of the importance of state action to the enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Warren Court began expanding the scope of the
doctrine to reach more ostensibly "private" conduct. Burton v. Wilmington
ParkingAuthority" arguably represents the zenith of this jurisprudential effort.
In Burton, the Justices articulated the "symbiotic relationship" test, under
which a federal court should hold an ostensibly private entity accountable
under the Fourteenth Amendment if it seems reasonable to do so in light of the
overall facts and circumstances. The Court characterized this test in terms of
a mutually beneficial relationship between a private entity and the state."8
However, the test really represented an open-ended inquiry into the relation-
ship between the state and the private entity in order to ascertain whether it
would be fundamentally fair to hold the private entity accountable for constitu-
tional violations.5 9
Similarly, in Reitman v. Mulkey,'c the Warren Court developed the
"nexus" test, which holds private entities accountable for constitutional viola-
tions when the government encourages or invites the constitutional violation.61
tory or wrongful"); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883) (describing
Fourteenth Amendment as protecting individuals from "exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical
power" by state governments, but not protecting "rights of one citizen against another"); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,638-39 (1882) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
state action, not private action); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (same).
55. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1963) (holding that
Greenville, South Carolina ordinance mandating segregation in public places, including
restaurants, removed decision to refuse service to minorities from private store's sphere of
choice and thereby made private store state actor when acting consistently with ordinance).
57. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
58. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961) ("Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance.").
59. See id. at 722-25 (examining various symbolic and financial connections between
State of Delaware and Eagle Coffee Shoppe and concluding that Eagle Coffee Shoppe was state
actor because of interdependent relationship).
60. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
61. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379-81 (1967) ("Here we are dealing with a
provision which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations.
1063
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In conjunction with the symbiotic relationship test, the nexus test casts a very
broad net indeed. State action doctrine is a complex field, and reasonable
people hold differing views as to what level of connection between the state
and a private entity justifies imposing constitutional obligations on an ostensi-
bly private entity. That said, the Warren Court's efforts made it very difficult
for government to avoid responsibility for racial discrimination by delegating
responsibility for the discriminatory actions to a private-sector entity. In this
way, the expanded scope of state action doctrine greatly facilitated the Warren
Court's equality project.
During the Burger Court and continuing into the Rehnquist Court, the
Justices have limited the scope of the Warren Court's state action precedents.
In a series of cases beginning inthe mid-1970s and continuing into the 1980s,
the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the state action doctrine consider-
ably.62 In case after case, the Justices declined to find state action present.63
Although never flatly overruled, the Warren Court precedents appeared to hold
significantly diminished binding power.
But sometimes the Warren Court's vision has an inescapable appeal.
The Warren Court's commitment to holding government responsible for
constitutional wrongs arguably represents one of those moments of moral
clarity that also yields a compelling legal principle. Although the Warren
Court's broad vision of state action fell into a state of desuetude under the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, it has proven to be more robust than some critics
might have anticipated.
In 2001, the Rehnquist Court returned to the Warren Court's broad
vision of state action in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass 'n.64 In that case, Justice Souter established a new state action
test - a test premised on "entwinement" between the state and the ostensibly
private entity. He explained: "If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be
displaced, therefore, its ambit cannot be a simple line between States and
Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing
market. The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State.").
62. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (concluding that federal
funding and regulation of home for elderly did not transform home into state actor); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (concluding that state-funded special needs school
that provided only special needs services in community, that used state funds, and that was
subject to state and local oversight was not state actor); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351-53, 357-59 (1974) (applying various state action tests and finding that heavily
regulated monopoly provider of electricity was not state actor).
63. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988)
(concluding that NCAA's imposition of sanctions against university was not state action); S.F.
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (conclud-
ing that United States Olympic Committee was not state actor).
64. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
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people operating outside formally governmental organizations, and the deed
of an ostensibly private organization or individual is to be treated sometimes
as if a State had caused it to be performed."65 Eschewing any simple (or
single) talismanic test, Justice Souter argued, "what is fairly attributable is a
matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity.""
Prior to Brentwood Academy, three basic state action tests had
emerged: the exclusive-government-function test,67 the symbiotic-relationship
test," and the nexus test.69 The Supreme Court also had held that the govern-
ment did not cease to be the government through the use of a corporate shell
to advance a public policy.7" The federal courts consistently applied these
tests independently and in isolation; factors relevant to one test were not
germane to the application of a different test.71 Brentwood Academy repre-
sents a marked departure from this methodology and reorients modem state
action analysis toward its Warren Court roots.
Justice Souter did not apply the state action tests in isolation to find
that the Association was a state actor. Instead, he examined the Association's
function, its membership, and its relationship to the State of Tennessee
(particularly to the Tennessee State Board of Education).72 Justice Souter
noted: "The entwinement down from the State Board is... unmistakable, just
as the entwinement up from the member public schools is overwhelming."73
The Brentwood Academy Court expressly recognized its departure
from prior state action precedents:
65. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,295 (2001).
66. Id.
67. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-62 (1978); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73,
88-89 (1932).
68. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722-26 (1961).
69. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1974).
70. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995) (holding that
government's advancement of public policy by creating corporation and remaining majority
shareholder results in corporation constituting part of government for purposes of state action
determination).
71. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 302, 304-05,
335-46 (1995) (arguing for "meta-analysis" in state action determinations, which means that
federal courts should apply state action tests both individually and conjunctively in "totality of
the circumstances" analysis using elements of all three state action tests).
72. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 233, 298-
302 (2001) (observing that athletic association had public institutions and officials involved in
its workings, financing, membership, and leadership positions).
73. Id. at 302.
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Entwinement is. . . the answer to the Association's several argu-
ments offered to persuade us that the facts would not support a
finding of state action under various criteria applied in other cases.
These arguments are beside the point, simply because the facts
justify a conclusion of state action under the criterion of
entwinement, a conclusion in no sense unsettled merely because
other criteria of state action may not be satisfied by the same facts. 4
This exposition represents a new and different state action test, an amalgam of
bits and pieces of evidence relevant to pre-existing state action tests but per-
haps insufficient to satisfy any one of those tests standing alone. That the
Association was not a state actor under these other state action tests was
irrelevant to the Court because "[e]ntwinement will support a conclusion that
an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public character
and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree shown here
requires it.""
The majority's novel approach brought howls of protest from three
dissenting Justices, led by Justice Thomas. He opened his dissent with the
trenchant observation that "[w]e have never found state action based upon mere
'entwinement.'"" Justice Thomas's statement was entirely accurate: the
entwinement test represented something new under the sun. Previously, state
action analysis required a plaintiff either to establish that the entity was the
government itself or to satisfy the exclusive-government-function test,
symbiotic-relationship test, or nexus test," Moreover, it is highly doubtful that
the Association fully satisfied any of the pre-existing state action tests."8
The majority acknowledged that the pre-existing state action tests
might not have justified its conclusion, but argued that this lack of justification
simply did not matter. "Facts that address any of these criteria [the other state
action tests] are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be applied."79
Thus, entwinement constitutes an independent test for the presence of state
action. "When, therefore, the relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the
point of largely overlapping identity, the implication of state action is not




76. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing all three traditional state action tests).
78. See id. at 308-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing and applying Court's traditional
state action tests and concluding that athletic association was not state actor under any of them).
79. Id. at 303.
80. Id.
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BrentwoodAcademy provides an important caveat to those who argue
that the Warren Court's legacy has proved fleeting. Even in areas in which
subsequent Courts appeared to have supplanted the Warren Court's methodol-
ogy, one may wonder whether everything old will be, in time, new again. This
possibility certainly appears less likely in the area of criminal law and crimi-
nal procedure. The basic drift of the Supreme Court since the Warren Court
has been away from expansive constructions of the rights of criminal defen-
dants. But even in the area of criminal law, one should not underestimate the
lingering effects of the Warren Court's legacy."' Gideon's trumpet has a way
of sounding when one least expects it."2
171. Three Views of the Warren Court's Legacy: The Past Critiqued,
Celebrated, and Recaptured
The panel Articles richly explore the promise and the perils of the
Warren Court's approach to civil rights and civil liberties. Professor BeVier
acknowledges the importance of the Warren Court's contribution to First
Amendment jurisprudence and its nexus with the federal government's efforts
to disestablish state-sponsored racial discrimination in the South: "Let us
begin with Justice Brennan's masterful and doctrinally innovative opinion in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a paradigmatic example of Warren Court
First Amendment jurisprudence in service of the civil rights cause." 3
Professor BeVier, endorsing the view of Professor Harry Kalven,
characterizes the decision as "almost as much a civil rights case as it was a
First Amendment case." 4 And Professor BeVier seems to believe that New
York Times Co. advanced, in a reasonably convincing way, the civil rights
agenda of the Warren Court. 5 But the long-term effects of the decision have
fallen wide of Justice Brennan's mark: "Put bluntly, New York Times Co. 's
direct progeny and their close cousins, namely the First Amendment cases
81. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally
retarded defendants violates Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment).
82. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1962) (expanding right to counsel
in criminal cases). Gideon served as one of the most visible icons of the Warren Court's efforts
in the field of criminal procedure.
83. Lillian R. BeVier, Intersection and Divergence: Some Reflections on the Warren
Court, Civil Rights, and the FirstAmendment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1075, 1080 (2002).
84. Id. at 1081.
85. See id. at 1083 (describing New York Times Co. as reflecting "deliberately strategic
approach to [the] First Amendment" intended to advance cause of civil rights for racial minori-
ties).
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dealing with libel and privacy, are for the most part an undistinguished lot of
surprisingly trivial cases clothed in ill-fitting but by now wholly conventional-
seeming First Amendment garb." 6
In Professor BeVier's view, the Warren Court's efforts to protect civil
rights through an expansive reading of the Free Speech Clause have devolved
into a "hodge-podge of supposedly constitutionally mandated adjustments to
the common law of libel."8 Professor BeVier convincingly offers a cautionary
note about the perils of unintended consequences. 8 Moreover, the Warren
Court appeared especially prone to overlook this sort of problem in its deci-
sions."
With free speech now being used by citizens affirmatively opposed
to pluralism and multiculturalism, doctrines fashioned to facilitate the end of
de jure segregation are now deployed to protect the Ku Klux Klan and the
American Nazi party and to attack efforts to create more inclusive communi-
ties through speech regulations such as campus speech codes. As Professor
BeVier notes, "It's a fair bet that the Warren Court never imagined that civil
liberties and civil rights could ever be on a collision course."9 Undoubtedly
the Warren Court could better have advanced its vision of the law had it
thought more comprehensively about the potential implications of both its
holdings and the reasons offered in support of them.
Professor Calmore presents a more sympathetic review of the Warren
Court's handiwork, at least insofar as its decisions helped to reframe and
recast the nation's thinking about issues of race. Rather than focusing on
discrete results and rationale in particular cases, Professor Calmore sees the
Warren Court's significance primarily in cultural terms. "I think that the real
value of the Warren Court's race jurisprudence lies in its force as a culture-
shifting tool and, more importantly, in its inspiration to advocates of social
justice."9'
Indeed, for Calmore the language of law is itself inadequate to the
task of reforming contemporary culture. He posits cultural studies as an
86. Id. at 1084.
87. Id. at 1085.
88. See id. at 1092 ("[O]ne of the most unhappy facts about the present day is that so
many scholars regard free speech as the enemy - or at least the potential enemy - of civil lights,
not its handmaiden.").
89. See text accompanying supra notes 34-40 (arguing that Boiling v. Sharpe's loose
reasoning facilitated end of federal affirmative action programs).
90. BeVier, supra note 83, at 1092.
91. John 0. Calmore, The Law and Culture Shift: Race and the Warren Court Legacy,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1099 (2002).
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essential addition to the nation's ongoing equality project. Professor Calmore
explains that:
I see the turn to cultural studies as both necessary and proper be-
cause social injustice seems to have overwhelmed the ability of law
to redress it. Further, legal scholarship, in the narrow sense, seems
quite inadequate to address what we need to know to open our
society, to promote a multiracial democracy, and to establish a more
just order. These values were the primary culture-shifting ambi-
tions of the Warren Court's race jurisprudence.92
The equality project, in Calmore's view, has surpassed the capabilities of
mere legal discourse. "The large shifts in society and culture over the nearly
fifty years since Brown v. Board of Education have outpaced the rights and
remedies that are part of the Warren Court's legacy."93 A turn to cultural
studies is therefore necessary because "[clultural studies is a tool to bridge
this gap.
9 4
Although Calmore asks rhetorically, "Did the Warren Court promise
too much or not enough?,"9' his arguments for the co-equal status of cultural
norms to legal norms in the equality project plainly moot the question.
Because the Warren Court limited its discourse to the formal language of law,
it could never have achieved the revolution in race relations that Calmore
believes to be an essential precondition to true equality. Of course, the
Warren Court's precedents were themselves constitutive of the community's
zeitgeist and affected the framing of race in contemporary American society.
From this point of view, it is reasonable to ask whether the Warren Court did
everything that it could to advance the equality project. But, plainly, if culture
has an inexorable pull on law and legal norms - as Calmore posits - the
Warren Court, by itself, could never do enough to remake society in a truly
egalitarian image.
Professor Calmore cogently argues that whatever shortcomings might
have inhered in the Warren Court's decisions on race, the subsequent decisions
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are far worse. In particular, he accuses the
Burger Court of a kind of willful blindness to the pervasive relevance of race
as a social phenomenon. Using City of Memphis v. Greene96 as a prism for
92. Id. at 1109.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1111.
96. 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (holding that City of Memphis could erect traffic barriers that
separated predominantly white neighborhood near public park from predominantly black
neighborhood on other side of street on theory that aesthetics and concern for unwanted traffic
provided race-neutral reasons for city's action).
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viewing the Supreme Court's framing of race issues, Professor Calmore argues
that the Court in that decision "legitimized the adverse representation of blacks
as 'undesirable traffic. '"' He goes on to discuss several incidents in which
race and racism manifest in both private and public contexts, without much
shame or remorse on the part of nonminorities."
Notwithstanding the backsliding that Calmore sees both in legal
doctrine and in everyday social relations, he believes that the equality project
is not doomed to failure. For it to succeed, "[w]e must recommit to the human-
izing aspects of the civil rights movement as it was organically connected to a
larger movement for freedom, justice, and human dignity."99 Continuing
efforts at effecting change through law are important, but so too are grassroots
efforts to change the culture in which law operates.
In particular, the framing devices used to present minorities must be
amended. According to Calmore, "We must reconstruct and re-present un-
wanted traffic as the human beings that they really are, as members of society
who deserve a fair shot at living their lives as part of the larger humanity within
this nation.""lce Famed civil rights judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., once noted:
"[]f the life of the law has been experience, then the law should be realistic
enough to treat certain issues as special, as racism is special in American
history. Ajudiciary that cannot declare that is of little value."10' The Warren
Court's legacy is an important, but only partial, contribution toward this goal.
Finally, Professor Peller believes that the Warren Court failed to grasp
the full implications of the equality project: the creation and enforcement of
positive constitutional rights."° The Warren Court attempted to remake
97. Calmore, supra note 91,at 1113.
98. See id. at 1122-28 (providing several anecdotes illustrating examples of contemporary
racism).
99. Id. at 1134.
100. Id. at 1138; cf Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:" The Mass Media,
Law, and African Americans, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 523, 553-66 (1993) (arguing that media
portrayals of racial minorities constitute powerful framing device that, quite literally, creates
image of minorities held by nonminorities); Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of
Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1442-58 (1996) (arguing that federal courts accept role-
model theories as relevant when such theories disadvantage minorities, but reject such theories
when minorities would benefit from consideration of role-model function and suggesting that
presence of positive minority role models benefits both minority and non-minority communi-
ties).
101. Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J.
901,908 (1979).
102. See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
Ci. L. REV. 864, 872-87 (1986) (describing distinction between positive and negative constitu-
tional rights and noting strong tradition of Supreme Court recognizing and enforcing only
negative constitutional rights).
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American society through the aggressive enforcement of negative constitu-
tional rights; yet, the kind of broad-based societal reform necessary to create
true conditions of equality might require the recognition and enforcement of
both negative and affirmative rights." a
In Peller's view, the Warren Court was too timid in requiring affirma-
tive state action to redress inequality: "Many of the celebrated Warren Court
rulings in the areas of individual and civil rights applied a de jure analysis,
and accordingly incorporated a conservative social theory, even as the rulings
seemed to favor progressive political and cultural positions."'14 These deci-
sions undermined the Warren Court's ability to promote progressive social
change because they limited government responsibility for structural impedi-
ments, such as poverty, to the exercise of constitutional rights and to meaning-
ful participation in the project of democratic self-governance. These rulings,
which "depended on the same libertarian image of a private realm free from
public power that it had so thoroughly discredited in the social and economic
area, 0 5 permitted the state to escape any responsibility for conditions of vast
inequality throughout American society.
Looking to Warren Court decisions like Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County'°6 and Sherbert v. Verner,'°7 Professor Peller
argues that the Warren Court perceived the importance of providing affirma-
103. See, e.g., Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary with Respect
to the Other Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455,469-71 (1977) (arguing that federal
courts must effectively remediate constitutional wrongs, even if this remediation requires
granting affirmative relief). In the context of institutional reform lawsuits involving state-run
prisons and mental hospitals, Judge Johnson stated:
Because of the complexity and nature of the constitutional rights and issues in-
volved, the traditional forms of relief have proven totally inadequate and the courts
have been left with two alternatives. They could throw up their hands in frustration
and claim that, although the litigants have established a violation of constitutional
or statutory rights, the courts have no satisfactory relief to grant them. This would,
in addition to constituting judicial abdication, make a mockery of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 471.
104. Gary Peller, A Subversive Strand of Warren Court Jurisprudence, 59 WAsH. & LEE
L. REv. 1141, 1164 (2002).
105. Id. at 1151.
106. See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (ordering
affirmative steps to integrate formerly segregated public schools and prohibiting use of volun-
tary "freedom-of-choice" plan as device that would lead to resegregation of New Kent County,
Virginia public schools).
107. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that Free Exercise Clause
mandates that state unemployment benefits be paid to Sabbatarian fired from job for refusing
to work on Saturday).
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tive relief, as opposed to merely prohibitory relief, for constitutional wrongs;
the Court often required remedial steps in addition to the cessation of the
unlawful discriminatory actions."°' As Judge Frank Johnson observed, "[Ihf
we, as judges, have learned anything from Brown v. Board of Education and
its progeny, it is that prohibitory relief alone affords but a hollow protection
to the basic and fundamental rights of citizens to equal protection of the
law."' Peller embraces this sort of reasoning and suggests that a focus on the
de facto effects of both government action and government inaction would
significantly improve the fundamental fairness of rights adjudication in
constitutional law. l"0 "The virtue of the defacto standard is that it permits a
wider appraisal of the social order to determine if the social conditions for
constitutional legitimacy actually exist .... [T]he defacto standard is linked
to views of collective responsibility and to the norm of social solidarity. "I
1
The implications of Professor Peller's proposal are quite broad. As
he himself notes, "[TIhe logical consequence of the victory of a general de
facto standard of constitutional review would be to subject virtually all
legislative action to judicial scrutiny - and the result is even more extreme
than that.""' A fully actualized defacto regime would empower the federal
courts to act proactively to create the conditions necessary for democratic self-
governance without "wait[ing] for legislative action at all - because govern-
mental inaction itself might be the reason for the inability to exercise rights
of free speech, or voting, or travel.""' 3 Ultimately, "were the Court to apply
widely the de facto standard, the judiciary would evaluate the entire social
field to ensure its consistency with constitutional norms.""' 4 Thus, Peller's
critique of the Warren Court is that it was not progressive enough - that it
recognized the limits of negative constitutional rights, worked around those
limits in a handful of cases, but otherwise failed to reorient rights discourse
in a way that would meaningfully empower economically disadvantaged
persons.
Peller's critique provides an interesting contrast with the commonly
held view that the Warren Court was, in fact, too activist. In essence, his
claim seems to be that the Warren Court was not activist enough. This claim
may well be true, and certainly vast disparities in wealth continue to exist in
108. Peller, supra note 104, at 1154-60.
109. Johnson, supra note 103, at 471.
110. Peller, supra note 104, at 1164-65.
111. Id. at 1163.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1164.
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the contemporary United States. It also appears reasonably clear that eco-
nomic need correlates with less active citizenship - particularly with respect
to voting.11" However, as a matter of practical politics one has to wonder if
the Warren Court could have successfully transformed the concept of rights
in the fashion that Peller suggests. A similar attempt by the Lochner-era
Court ultimately failed, and in the process the Supreme Court managed to
discredit itself to the point of generating bizarre court-packing schemes." 6
Political realities might well have impeded the sort of jurisprudence that Peller
advocates or, presumably worse yet from his perspective, succeeded in
creating a discourse of positive rights, only to have that discourse reoriented
from the poor and powerless to the propertied." 7
Ultimately, one can only speculate about what the Warren Court
legacy might have become had the Court embraced the full implications of its
recognition of positive rights in cases like Green and Sherbert. Professor
Peller's Article posits the possibility of a constitutional jurisprudence more
congenial to the progressive agenda. Perhaps this could have been so; perhaps
not. In either case, it bears noting that at least some critics on the Left see the
Warren Court's legacy as reflecting undue timidity, as opposed to unseemly
haste, in the creation and enforcement of rights.
IV Conclusion
The Warren Court presided over arguably the most important period
for the development of human rights in the United States. Indeed, the Warren
Court's overall importance is second only to that of the Marshall Court, which
established the strong system of judicial review that prevails today (to say
nothing of its efforts to sustain a strong and effective national government).11
115. See James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The
Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 124-31, 136-49 (1996) (discussing
relationship of basic material needs to meaningful participation in civic life).
116. SeeW]LUAME.LEUCHTENBURG,FRANKLIND.RooSEVELTANDTHENEwDEAL,1932-
1940, at 143-46, 231-39 (1963) (describing Supreme Court's protracted efforts to block New
Deal programs and President Roosevelt's response to Court's intransigence - a plan to "pack"
Court with Justices thought to be supportive of Roosevelt's programs).
117. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (concluding that retroactive
funding mechanism for retired coal miners' health benefit coverage violated Takings Clause);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-96 (1994) (interpreting Takings Clause to disallow
city's conditional approval of zoning variance).
118. See Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren: Master of the Revels, 96 HARV. L. REV. 331,
332 (1982) (book review) (noting common view among legal academics that Chief Justice
Warren "is the greatest or second greatest judge in American history, depending on where they
rank John Marshall").
1073
1074 59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1055 (2002)
The Articles that follow bear testament to the importance of this period in
American constitutional law. That the authors have such divergent attitudes
about the work product of the Warren Court and its continuing legacy reflects
the gravity of the Warren Court's decisions and the innovative means that it
used to reach them.
The echoes of the Warren Court continue to reverberate in contempo-
rary constitutional law discourse. It has been thus for the past fifty years and
will likely be so for the next fifty. Questions of equality and fundamental
fairness - the central projects of the Warren Court - will remain salient so
long as some citizens perceive a lack of equality or fairness in the status quo.
And although we have come a long way since Brown v. Board of Education,
we still have a great distance to travel before the words "Equal Justice for All"
describe a universally lived reality rather than merely a grand and hopeful
aspiration.
